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DELPHI PENSION PLANS
GM Agreements with Unions Give Rise to Unique 
Differences in Participant Benefits  
Why GAO Did This Study 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) terminated the 
underfunded six qualified defined 
benefit (DB) plans of the Delphi 
Corporation, a former subsidiary of 
General Motors (GM), in July 2009.  
Given questions about how PBGC 
came to terminate the plans, whether 
treatment for certain Delphi workers 
was preferential, and the role of the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury) in these outcomes, GAO 
was asked to answer the following 
questions:  
(1) What precipitated PBGC’s decision 
to terminate Delphi’s plans and what 
was Treasury's role, if any? 
(2) What actions did PBGC take to 
secure Delphi domestic and foreign 
assets as part of its recovery process?  
(3) Why will certain Delphi employees 
receive reduced pension benefits and 
others will not?  
(4) What information was 
communicated to employees about the 
termination of their plans? 
GAO issued a timeline of key events 
leading to the plans’ termination in 
March 2011 (GAO-11-373R). To 
examine the issues more fully for this 
report, GAO analyzed additional 
information from PBGC, Treasury, GM, 
Delphi, and Delphi employee groups 
and unions, and interviewed 
representatives from those 
organizations. For comparison 
purposes, GAO also reviewed the 
termination and recovery processes for 
all ten firms with the largest termination 
claims from plans trusteed by PBGC. 
Treasury’s comments generally agreed 
with GAO’s findings and conclusions.  
What GAO Found 
As a result of the termination of Delphi’s pension plans in July 2009 and statutory 
benefit limits, many Delphi retirees will receive less from PBGC than their full 
benefit promised by Delphi. However, some of those experiencing statutory 
reductions will still receive their full benefits because of union agreements with 
GM. With respect to PBGC's role in the process, the steps taken to terminate the 
plans and reduce some benefits according to statutory limits are consistent with 
PBGC’s usual actions when terminating large plans.  
 PBGC’s decision to terminate the plans was ultimately precipitated by the 
apparent lack of a viable sponsor, impending foreclosure on Delphi’s assets, 
and the prospect of increased losses for PBGC and the plans that would 
occur upon liquidation. Similar factors were often at play in PBGC’s decisions 
to terminate other large plans we reviewed.  
 PBGC used its authority under the law to file liens and negotiate recoveries 
of corporate assets on behalf of Delphi’s plans. Although PBGC ultimately 
recovered only about 6 percent of the total unfunded benefit liabilities in 
these plans, this ratio falls within the range of recovery ratios for other large 
terminated plans we reviewed. 
 Among the Delphi plan participants PBGC had reviewed as of June 2011, 
just under half of both hourly and salaried plan participants received 
reductions in their promised benefits due to the application of statutory 
benefit limits. While initial estimates indicate a higher proportion of Delphi 
retirees have been subject to the guarantee limits compared with retirees of 
most other large terminated plans, PBGC expects Delphi’s higher proportion 
to decline once all benefit calculations are finalized. 
 Delphi sent required communications to employees concerning deteriorating 
plan funding, and PBGC sent communications concerning plan termination 
and its impact on participants’ benefits. 
However, the role that GM played in the process was more unusual. Some Delphi 
hourly plan participants are protected from benefit losses caused by statutory limits 
because GM agreed to “top up” potential benefit losses for certain Delphi union 
employees. These agreements were renewed and upheld at numerous points in 
Delphi’s history, including by the “new GM” established in July 2009. Because of 
these agreements, about 60 percent of the participants in the hourly plan will have 
any statutory reductions in their benefits restored by GM. Other hourly employees, 
as well as all employees in Delphi’s salaried plan and the other smaller plans. were 
never covered by comparable top-up agreements. 
Although acknowledging the significant role Treasury played in GM's 
restructuring, GM and Treasury officials stated that Treasury’s role was advisory 
concerning GM’s decisions not to take on additional Delphi pension liabilities but 
to honor the top-up agreements with some unions. Similarly, PBGC officials 
stated that PBGC independently made the decision to terminate the plans. Still, 
in response to a prior GAO recommendation, Treasury revised its reporting policy 
to increase transparency on its activities related to the auto industry. GAO 
believes that the most effective means of addressing concerns about Treasury’s 
multiple roles regarding pensions is also through such increased transparency. 
View GAO-12-168. For more information, 
contact Barbara Bovbjerg at 202-512-7215 or 
bovbjergb@gao.gov. 
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United States Government Accountability Office 
Washington, DC 20548 
December 15, 2011 
Congressional Requesters 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the government 
corporation that insures private-sector defined benefit (DB) plans, 
terminated the six plans of Delphi Corporation (Delphi) in July 2009.1
Since the termination, there has been controversy over different pension 
benefit outcomes for certain unionized and non-unionized Delphi retirees. 
Further, the involvement of the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(Treasury) in the bankruptcy of General Motors (GM), Delphi’s former 
parent company, raised questions for some regarding the role that 
Treasury played in PBGC’s decision to terminate Delphi’s pension plans 
and the resulting outcomes for Delphi plan participants. Given these 
concerns, you asked us to answer the following questions: 
 The 
plans were estimated to be underfunded by a combined $7.2 billion at 
termination, of which PBGC expects to cover about $6 billion. 
1. What precipitated PBGC’s decision to terminate the plans and what 
was Treasury’s role, if any? 
2. What actions did PBGC take to secure Delphi domestic and foreign 
assets as part of its recovery process? 
3. Why will certain Delphi employees receive reduced pension benefits 
and others will not? 
4. What information was communicated to employees about the 
termination of their plans? 
In March 2011, we issued a report providing a timeline of key events 
related to the Delphi plan terminations in which we provided information 
about some of these issues.2
                                                                                                                       
1A DB plan promises a benefit that is generally based on an employee’s years of service 
and, often, compensation as well. The employer is generally responsible for funding all or 
most of the benefit, investing and managing plan assets, and bearing the investment risk. 
 To address the issues more fully for this 
2GAO, Key Events Leading to the Termination of the Delphi Defined Benefit Plans, 
GAO-11-373R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2011). 
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report, we conducted additional analysis of PBGC documents, such as 
benefit estimates, actuarial reports, internal documents on the termination 
decision and on asset recovery, and reports from PBGC’s Office of 
Inspector General. We also conducted follow-up interviews with PBGC 
officials to clarify information from the documents. To explore further 
Treasury’s role in the termination of Delphi’s pension plans, we reviewed 
publicly available documents, such as Treasury officials’ depositions and 
other legal documents, including those related to pending litigation,3 and 
conducted additional interviews of GM, Delphi, and the Delphi Salaried 
Retiree Association (DSRA). We reviewed relevant e-mails provided by 
PBGC and DSRA.4
To provide benchmarks and comparative examples, we also gathered 
data about other terminated plans from PBGC’s list of firms with the ten 
biggest termination claims in PBGC’s history. (Delphi is number two on 
this list, behind United Airlines.)
 We also interviewed union, GM, Delphi, and DSRA 
officials to obtain their perspectives on plan termination, asset recovery, 
benefit determination, and communications, as well as analyzed 
additional documents related to these issues from these groups, including 
data from GM about benefit guarantees they have paid or expect to pay 
to former Delphi employees. 
5
                                                                                                                       
3Delphi Salaried retirees are in litigation against PBGC regarding termination of Delphi’s 
pension plans. Black v. PBGC, No. 2:09-cv-13616 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. filed Nov. 5, 2009). 
In September 2011, the court dismissed the retirees’ claims against Treasury and 
Treasury officials. Order Granting Defendant United States Department of the Treasury, 
Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry, Timothy F. Geithner, Steven L. Rattner, and 
Ron. A. Bloom’s Reviewed Motion to Dismiss, No. 09-13616 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2011). It 
is GAO policy to avoid taking a position or addressing claims that are currently in litigation. 
This review was structured to avoid influencing or interfering with the litigation and this 
report does not address the legal issues involved in the litigation. 
 For example, to provide context for how 
PBGC pursued recoveries for Delphi, we reviewed the recovery process 
for all nine of the other firms on this list, and identified the allocation of 
recoveries across priority groups for all plans with more than 5,000 
participants (18 of the 29 plans these firms sponsored). We did not 
examine PBGC’s actions to date to value Delphi’s assets, as this effort is 
4The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) is 
conducting an audit of Treasury’s role in GM’s decision to provide top-ups for certain 
hourly workers, including whether the Administration or Treasury pressured GM to provide 
additional funding for the hourly plan. SIGTARP has not announced when it expects to 
complete this audit. 
5See appendix I for a summary description of PBGC’s 10 largest terminations. 
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still ongoing. PBGC’s Office of Inspector General has recently reported on 
deficiencies in PBGC’s efforts to value assets for two other firms on the 
top-10 list: National Steel and United Airlines.6
We conducted this work between April 2011 and December 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We found the 
data from PBGC and GM sufficiently reliable for the purpose of helping us 
answer our research questions, and we believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. 
 According to the Inspector 
General’s office, the contractor identified as having conducted the 
valuation of assets for both the National Steel and United Airlines 
terminations is not the contractor conducting the valuation of assets for 
Delphi. 
 
 
 
Delphi was a global supplier of mobile electronics and transportation 
systems that began as part of GM and was spun off as an independent 
company in 1999.7
                                                                                                                       
6PBGC Office of Inspector General Evaluation Report, PBGC’s Plan Asset Audit of 
National Steel Pension Plans Was Seriously Flawed (OIG Eval-2011-10/PA-09-66-1, 
Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2011); “
 At that time, Delphi established two pension plans, 
with assets and liabilities transferred from their GM counterparts: the 
Delphi Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan (hourly plan) and the Delphi 
Retirement Program for Salaried Employees (salaried plan). When Delphi 
was spun off from GM in 1999, GM was required to collectively bargain 
with the affected unions—including International Union, United 
Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America 
(UAW); the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine 
Letter to Chairman Miller of The Committee on 
Education and Labor Regarding PBGC Termination of United Airlines Pension Plans” 
(LTR-2010-10, Washington, D.C.: Jul. 20, 2010); and PBGC Processing of Terminated 
United Airlines Pension Plans Was Seriously Deficient, (OIG, Eval-2012-05/PA-10-72, 
Washington, D.C: Nov. 30, 2011).  
7For a more detailed treatment of this history, see GAO-11-373R. 
Background 
Delphi-GM History 
 
  
 
 
 
Page 4 GAO-12-168  Delphi Pension Plans   
and Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE);8 and the United Steelworkers of 
America (USWA); as well as other “splinter” unions.9 As a result of these 
negotiations, GM agreed to provide a retirement benefit supplement 
(referred to as “top-ups”) to “covered employees” with UAW, IUE, or 
USWA (but not the splinter unions), should the Delphi hourly plan be 
frozen or terminated.10
Over the period 2001 to 2005, Delphi suffered large losses, and the 
company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in October 2005, although it 
continued to operate.
 Covered employees included those who had been 
represented by these unions as GM workers and now as Delphi workers 
with no break in employment or seniority as of May 28, 1999. Salaried 
employees and hourly employees not in the three unions were not 
covered by top-up agreements. 
11
                                                                                                                       
8Effective October 1, 2000, IUE merged with the Communications Workers of America to 
become the Industrial Division of CWA (IUE-CWA); for the purposes of this report, we 
continue to refer to this entity as the IUE. 
 Beginning in the fall of 2008, economic conditions 
deteriorated throughout the auto industry, affecting both Delphi and GM. 
GM’s deteriorating financial condition in the fall of 2008 led the company 
to seek assistance from Treasury through the Automotive Industry 
9The splinter unions include the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Michigan Regional Council of 
Carpenters, Local 687 and Interior Systems, Local 1045; International Brotherhood of 
Painters and Allied Trades of the United States and Canada, Sign & Display Union Local 
59; International Brotherhood of Teamsters; International Brotherhood of Boilermakers; 
International Union of Operating Engineers; and United Catering Restaurant Bar & Hotel 
Workers. 
10The top-up agreements were originally set to expire in October 2007. In June 2007, GM, 
Delphi, and UAW entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) extending the GM 
benefit guarantee for Delphi UAW workers, which would be enforceable if benefit accruals 
for future credited service in the Delphi hourly plan were frozen and if the plan were 
terminated. On August 5, 2007, GM and Delphi entered into a MOU with Delphi IUE, and 
on August 16, 2007, with Delphi USWA, providing the same top-up guarantee as the 
Delphi UAW MOU. 
11Failing entities choose to go through Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code when they 
hope to reorganize and stay in business rather than liquidate and go out of business. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174. 
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Financing Program (AIFP).12 As a condition of receiving this assistance, 
GM was required to develop a restructuring plan to identify how the 
company planned to achieve and sustain long-term financial viability. In 
April and May 2009, Treasury worked with GM to develop a restructuring 
plan through the Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry and its 
staff. On June 1, 2009, GM filed for bankruptcy and sought the approval 
of the bankruptcy court for the sale of substantially all of the company’s 
assets to a new entity (“new GM”).13
Soon after, PBGC terminated Delphi’s six DB plans (Delphi having 
acquired four more since the spin-off from GM), effective July 31, 2009, 
with almost 70,000 participants (see table 1). According to PBGC, as of 
the termination date, the Delphi plans were underfunded by 
approximately $7.2 billion, of which PBGC insurance would cover an 
estimated $6.0 billion. In October 2009, after 4 years in bankruptcy, 
Delphi completed its reorganization when Delphi Automotive LLP (“new” 
Delphi), a United Kingdom limited partnership, purchased most of 
Delphi’s assets and GM purchased 4 other Delphi sites. “Old” Delphi 
became DPH Holdings Corp., an entity set up to sell or dispose of any 
remaining assets. 
 After the sale of the assets in July 
2009, new GM began operating with substantially less debt and Treasury 
received 60.8 percent equity and $2.1 billion in preferred stock in the new 
GM, and a $6.7 billion GM debt obligation. 
                                                                                                                       
12In December 2008, Treasury established AIFP under the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) to help stabilize the U.S. automotive industry and avoid disruptions that would 
pose systemic risk to the nation’s economy. TARP was authorized under the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. No. 110-343 div. A, 122 Stat. 3765 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5261). EESA originally authorized Treasury to 
purchase or guarantee up to $700 billion in troubled assets. § 115(a), 122 Stat. 3780. The 
Public-Private Investment Program Improvement and Oversight Act of 2009 amended 
EESA to reduce the maximum allowable amount of outstanding troubled assets under 
EESA by almost $1.3 billion, from $700 billion to $698.741 billion. Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 
402, § 402(f), 123 Stat. 1656, 1658. EESA requires that the appropriate committees of 
Congress be notified in writing when the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with 
the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines that 
it is necessary to purchase other financial instruments to promote financial market 
stability. § 3(9)(B), 122 Stat. 3767 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5202(9)(B)). 
13Throughout this report, in cases where a distinction is important, we refer to the pre-
bankruptcy entity as “old GM” and the new one that purchased its operating assets as 
“new GM.” Prior to bankruptcy, old GM’s legal name was General Motors Corporation. 
The legal name of the new entity created in July 2009 was General Motors Company. As 
of October 19, 2009, General Motors Company became General Motors LLC. 
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Table 1: Terminated Delphi Defined Benefit Plans, as of July 31, 2009  
Plan  Number of participants  
Delphi Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan (hourly plan)  47,176  
Delphi Retirement Program For Salaried Employees 
(salaried plan)  
20,203  
Packard-Hughes Interconnect Non-Bargaining Retirement 
Plan  
1,383  
ASEC Manufacturing Retirement Program  533  
Packard-Hughes Interconnect Bargaining Retirement Plan  165 
Delphi Mechatronic Systems Retirement Program  148  
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 
 
PBGC was created as a government corporation by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)14 to help insure the 
retirement income of U.S. workers with private-sector defined benefit 
plans. Under PBGC’s single-employer insurance program, if a company’s 
pension plan has inadequate funds to pay all promised benefits, plan 
sponsors meeting certain criteria can seek to terminate a plan through a 
“distress” termination.15 Under certain circumstances, PBGC may also 
decide to terminate an underfunded plan.16
PBGC pays participants’ benefits only up to certain limits set forth by 
ERISA and related regulations. Participants whose benefits under the 
plan would otherwise exceed these statutory limits may have their 
benefits reduced to the guaranteed amount, unless the plan has sufficient 
assets to pay the nonguaranteed portion of their benefits, either in part or 
 In all these situations, PBGC 
is generally appointed trustee of the plan, as provided under ERISA, and 
assumes responsibility for paying benefits to the participants. 
                                                                                                                       
14Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified, as amended, at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461). 
15At least one of the following criteria must be present in order for PBGC to approve a 
distress termination: (1) liquidation in bankruptcy (Chapter 7) or insolvency proceedings; 
(2) reorganization in bankruptcy (Chapter 11); (3) inability to pay debts while in business 
without terminating a plan; or (4) unreasonably, burdensome pension costs caused solely 
by a decline in workers covered by the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B). 
1629 U.S.C. § 1342(a). 
ERISA Guarantee Limits, 
Benefit Determination 
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in full. These guarantee limits include the phase-in limit, the accrued-at-
normal limit, and the maximum limit, as illustrated in table 2.17
Table 2: Types of Guaranteed Benefit Limits under ERISA 
 
Maximum limita Phase-in limitb Accrued-at-normal limitc 
• The guaranteed benefit cannot exceed 
the statutory maximum, adjusted annually, 
at the time the plan terminates. 
• In 2009 (the year Delphi’s plans were 
terminated), the maximum was $54,000 
per year for a person retiring at age 65 
and with no survivor benefit (that is, a 
single-life annuity). 
• The maximum is lower for those retiring 
under age 65 or with a survivor benefit. 
• The guaranteed benefit cannot 
include any benefit increase 
implemented through a plan 
amendment that was made 
within 1 year of the date of the 
plan termination. 
• For benefit improvements that 
became effective more than 1 
year but less than 5 years prior 
to the plan’s termination, the 
guaranteed amount is the larger 
of 20 percent of the benefit 
increase or $20 per month of the 
increase for each full year the 
increase was in effect. 
• The monthly guaranteed benefit cannot be 
greater than the monthly benefit provided 
as a straight-life annuity (that is, a periodic 
payment for the life of the retiree, with no 
additional payments to survivors) 
available at the plan’s normal retirement 
age. 
• The portion of any combined early 
retirement benefit and supplemental 
benefit that exceeds the normal retirement 
age straight life annuity is not guaranteed. 
Source: ERISA, PBGC’s implementing regulations, and related documents. 
a29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3); 29 C.F.R. § 4022.23 (2011). 
b29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) and (7); 29 C.F.R. § 4022.25 (2011). 
c29 C.F.R. § 4022.21 (2011). 
 
Determining participants’ benefit amounts following plan termination is a 
complex process. It begins with PBGC gathering extensive data on plans 
and individuals’ work and personnel histories, and determining who is 
eligible for benefits under a plan, which can be more complicated if the 
company or plan has a history of mergers or elaborate structure or is 
missing data. It requires understanding plan provisions that vary from 
plan to plan and can be voluminous, applying the ERISA guarantee limits 
to each individual’s benefit, valuing plan assets and liabilities, and 
determining which participants may receive additional benefits from any 
assets PBGC may recover from the sponsor. Final determination of 
benefits can take years, especially in a large, complex plan.18
                                                                                                                       
17For more details on how these limits affected Delphi participant benefits, see appendix II. 
 If the 
participant is already retired, or retires before the process is complete, 
18For more information on PBGC benefit determination, see GAO, Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation: More Strategic Approach Needed for Processing Complex Plans 
Prone to Delays and Overpayments (GAO-09-716; Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2009). 
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PBGC makes payments to the retiree initially based on an estimate of the 
final benefit amount. Once the process is complete, PBGC notifies each 
participant of the final benefit amount through a “benefit determination 
letter.” 
 
As of September 30, 2011, PBGC insured the benefits of about 44 million 
workers and retirees in more than 27,000 private DB plans. PBGC 
receives no funds from general tax revenue and is financed by premiums 
paid by DB plan sponsors, investment income, and assets that PBGC 
acquires when it assumes control of a plan.19 As of the end of fiscal year 
2011, PBGC had terminated and trusteed a total of 4,300 plans, and its 
net accumulated financial deficit totaled $26 billion.20
PBGC is governed by a three-member board of directors consisting of the 
Secretaries of the Treasury, Labor, and Commerce, who are responsible 
for establishing and overseeing the policies of the agency.
 Additionally, at fiscal 
year-end, PBGC’s estimate of total plan underfunding in plans sponsored 
by financially risky single-employer program companies totaled 
approximately $227 billion, up significantly from $170 billion the year 
before. 
21 According to 
PBGC, PBGC’s director is responsible for managing PBGC’s day-to-day 
operations, including, according to PBGC, such decisions as whether and 
when to terminate particular pension plans.22  We designated PBGC’s 
single-employer pension insurance program as “high risk” in 2003, 
including it on our list of major programs that need urgent attention and 
transformation.23
                                                                                                                       
1929 U.S.C. § 1305. 
 In 2007 and 2008, we reported that PBGC’s board had 
20PBGC’s net accumulated financial deficit equals the total liabilities of the single employer 
program and the financial assistance unlikely to be repaid from the multiemployer 
program, less total assets in both programs. 
2129 U.S.C. § 1302(d) and (f) and 29 C.F.R. § 4002.3 (2011). 
22ERISA specifies that in carrying out PBGC’s functions, PBGC is to be administered by 
its director. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a). 
23GAO, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Single-Employer Insurance Program: Long-
Term Vulnerabilities Warrant ‘High Risk’ Designation, GAO-03-1050SP (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2003). 
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limited time and resources to fulfill its responsibilities.24
 
 The program, 
along with PBGC’s other insurance program, remains high risk due to an 
ongoing threat of losses from the terminations of underfunded plans. 
In previous reports, we also have examined the challenges posed to 
Treasury due to its multiple roles as a private pension regulator 25 and a 
GM shareholder, as well as having its Secretary serve on the PBGC 
board.26 In its role on PBGC’s board and as a pension regulator, Treasury 
has an interest in protecting the viability of private defined benefit pension 
plans and the retirement incomes of plan participants. But as a GM 
shareholder, Treasury has an interest in the financial well-being of GM. 
Recognizing the potential for interested parties to perceive possible 
conflicts, we reported that Treasury has taken several steps to mitigate 
this risk. For example, the department adopted core principles to guide its 
oversight of its investments under TARP and limit its involvement in day-
to-day operations of companies. The department also has taken steps to 
establish a protective barrier between Treasury officials who make policy-
related decisions with respect to investments in the automakers and the 
Treasury officials who are responsible for regulating pensions or 
overseeing the operations of PBGC. Nevertheless, we noted that the 
tensions inherent in Treasury’s multiple roles remained.27
                                                                                                                       
24GAO, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Governance Structure Needs 
Improvements to Ensure Policy Direction and Oversight, 
 In one previous 
report, we concluded that Treasury’s investment in the auto companies 
created an enhanced need for transparency, and we recommended that 
GAO-07-808 (Washington, D.C.: 
July 2007); GAO, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Need for Improved Oversight 
Persists, GAO-08-1062 (Washington, D.C.: September 2008). 
25The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), within Treasury, oversees the tax qualified status of 
pension plans. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a).  
26See GAO, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Automaker Pension Funding and Multiple 
Federal Roles Pose Challenges for the Future, GAO-10-492, (Washington, D.C.: April 6, 
2010); GAO, Troubled Asset Relief Program: The U.S. Government Role as Shareholder 
in AIG, Citigroup, Chrysler, and General Motors and Preliminary Views on its Investment 
Management Activities, GAO-10-325T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2009); GAO, Troubled 
Asset Relief Program: Status of Efforts to Address Transparency and Accountability 
Issues, GAO-09-296 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2009); and GAO, Troubled Asset Relief 
Program: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure Accountability, Integrity, and 
Transparency, GAO-09-161 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2, 2008). 
27For more on this topic, see GAO-10-492, pp. 42-45. 
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Treasury should regularly communicate to Congress about TARP 
activities to ensure accountability and provide added assurances that the 
taxpayers’ investment is being appropriately safeguarded.28 In a 
subsequent report, we reiterated this recommendation, and noted that by 
providing a more complete picture of the companies’ financial 
performance, Treasury also could help mitigate potential or perceived 
tensions in its multiple roles.29 Although Treasury had initially expressed 
concerns about disclosing proprietary information in a competitive market, 
it agreed to provide information on its oversight of the companies’ 
performance that balances the need for transparency with the need to 
protect certain proprietary business information.30 
 
PBGC’s decision to terminate the Delphi DB plans was precipitated by 
Delphi’s inability to fund or maintain its plans and by the threat of 
increased losses from Delphi’s impending loan default and possible 
liquidation. Treasury, as GM’s primary lender in bankruptcy, played a 
significant role in helping GM resolve the Delphi bankruptcy to arrive at 
the “best resolution” from GM’s perspective.31 However, with regard to 
GM’s decisions regarding the assumption of Delphi’s plans and top-up 
agreements, Treasury played an advisory role only, according to GM and 
Treasury officials. Similarly, according to PBGC officials, PBGC 
independently decided to terminate the Delphi plans. The documents we 
reviewed, including GM and Delphi SEC filings and PBGC internal 
records, are consistent with these statements. 
                                                                                                                       
28GAO, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Continued Stewardship Needed as Treasury 
Develops Strategies for Monitoring and Divesting Financial Interests in Chrysler and GM, 
GAO-10-151 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2, 2009). Specifically, we recommended that 
Treasury report to Congress on how it planned to assess and monitor GM’s and Chrysler’s 
performance to help ensure the companies are on track to repay their loans and to return 
to profitability. 
29GAO-10-492. 
30Because of Treasury’s concerns about disclosing proprietary information in a 
competitive market, Treasury responded to our recommendation by providing GAO, as a 
congressional oversight body, with information on how it was using sensitive business 
information to oversee the companies’ performance. This approach was consistent with 
our recommendation that noted the need for transparency to be balanced with protecting 
certain propriety information.  
31Deposition of Matthew Feldman, Black v. PBGC, No. 04-44481 (RDD) (S.D. N.Y. July 
21, 2009). 
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PBGC officials said the agency would have preferred to have Delphi 
emerge from bankruptcy and continue to sponsor the plans rather than 
terminate them. Delphi had announced in March 2006 that a key objective 
in restructuring was to continue to sponsor both the hourly and salaried 
DB plans. Therefore, PBGC’s activities were focused on allowing the 
plans to continue after Delphi exited bankruptcy and having a reorganized 
Delphi continue to fund the plans. While PBGC has authority under 
ERISA to involuntarily terminate a plan that fails to meet certain 
conditions,32
The vision was not realized, however. The Delphi bankruptcy court 
confirmed Delphi’s reorganization plan in January 2008, but on April 4, 
2008, Delphi’s investors retracted an offer that would have executed the 
plan and prevented the termination of its pension plans. Delphi also 
negotiated with GM, Delphi’s former parent company, to assume Delphi’s 
hourly plan, but these efforts were only partially successful. Under a 
change to an agreement initially negotiated between the companies in 
2007, GM would assume the hourly plan in two phases; this would reduce 
Delphi’s overall pension liabilities and make it more attractive to investors, 
while Delphi would continue sponsoring the salaried plan. After making 
some changes to the agreement, the first phase occurred in September 
2008, transferring approximately $2.1 billion in net liabilities from Delphi to 
GM. However, the second phase, in which GM would have absorbed 
substantially all of the remaining hourly plan liabilities, was conditional on 
Delphi successfully reorganizing.
 PBGC officials said that they hoped that avoiding termination 
would save both the agency and plan participants from potential losses 
from unfunded plan benefits. 
33
 
 In July 2009, after Delphi’s attempts to 
reorganize failed, and with GM in its own bankruptcy, GM decided not to 
take on the remaining liabilities of Delphi’s hourly plan. According to 
representatives of GM, after it was clear Delphi would not be able to 
reorganize, Delphi asked GM to take the salaried plan as well; however, 
GM declined. 
                                                                                                                       
32Under ERISA, PBGC has authority to involuntarily terminate a plan that fails to meet 
minimum funding standards, will be unable to pay benefits due, failed to make quarterly 
contributions, or is reasonably expected to increase long term losses to PBGC if not 
terminated. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a). 
33Delphi also agreed that the reorganized Delphi would provide GM with up to a $2.055 
billion administrative claim. 
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By 2009, PBGC determined that the economic decline and the collapse of 
the U.S. auto industry had diminished the likelihood that Delphi, GM, or 
another company would be able and willing to sponsor Delphi’s plans. 
Moreover, it became apparent to PBGC officials that PBGC’s potential 
losses could grow if it waited. Delphi net sales, already on a steady 
decline since 2003, had fallen 50 percent between 2008 and 2009, and 
funding for Delphi’s plans had been eroding since 2007.34
According to PBGC officials, the likelihood that Delphi would default on its 
debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan, and the potential impact on PBGC 
recoveries, moved them in April 2009 to decide to terminate the Delphi 
plans. Delphi’s SEC filing that month stated that Delphi’s short-term loan 
from its DIP lenders was due to expire, and that extension of the loan was 
conditional on Delphi (1) delivering the lenders terms, agreed to by 
Treasury and GM; and (2) finalizing GM’s contributions to the resolution 
of Delphi’s bankruptcy. The filing noted that failure to meet these terms 
would trigger a requirement that Delphi make a $117 million repayment 
obligation on April 20. With Delphi unlikely to make this payment, it was 
possible that the lenders would foreclose on Delphi assets held as 
collateral. Foreclosure would have threatened PBGC’s ability to recover 
Delphi Corporation assets on behalf of its plans, which would in turn have 
increased PBGC’s and Delphi plan participant losses from plan 
termination. With a deteriorating auto industry and no foreseeable 
sponsor for the Delphi plans, and with potential recoveries threatened, 
PBGC concluded that the agency’s long-run loss would increase if the 
plans were not terminated. 
 Delphi’s largest 
customer, GM, amidst the lowest per-capita vehicle sales in 50 years, 
requested financial assistance from the U.S. government in December 
2008. These conditions diminished the likelihood that Delphi would be 
able to continue operating and maintain its pension plans. 
Ultimately, however, PBGC postponed termination. The urgency to 
terminate in April, was reduced after Delphi’s DIP lenders offered PBGC a 
5-business day notice prior to foreclosing, fearing, according to PBGC, 
                                                                                                                       
34Different estimates, done on different dates and using different methodologies intended 
for different purposes, measured varying degrees of funding in Delphi’s salaried plan. 
According to Delphi, the salaried plan was 53.7 percent funded as of year-end 2008 and 
was still 53.7 percent funded as of the date of plan termination on July 31, 2009. DSRA, 
based on an actuarial evaluation by Watson Wyatt, reported the salaried plan was 85.6 
percent funded as of October 1, 2008. PBGC measured salaried plan funding at 48 
percent as of termination on July 31, 2009. 
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that termination of Delphi’s pension plans would reduce Delphi’s value. In 
a June 1, 2009, press release, Delphi stated that the hourly plan would 
“be addressed” by GM and that PBGC “may” terminate the salaried and 
four smaller plans. According to Treasury, PBGC later confirmed that GM 
was not an alternative sponsor for the Delphi hourly plan. On June 30, 
2009, a meeting took place between PBGC and Treasury to discuss the 
Delphi plans; according to PBGC, Treasury informed PBGC officials that 
GM would not assume the remaining Delphi hourly pension liabilities. 
Finally, on July 15, 2009, Delphi’s DIP lenders gave PBGC a notice of 
foreclosure under the April agreement. With no willing and viable sponsor, 
PBGC officials expected the plans would be abandoned with no sponsor 
to pay benefits as they came due. On July 22, 2009, PBGC announced 
that Delphi’s plans would be terminated. The termination date was set to 
be July 31, 2009, and PBGC officially became the trustee of the plans on 
August 10, 2009. Delphi’s claim was the second largest in PBGC’s 
history, following United Airlines as the largest. 
Our examination of PBGC termination decisions for nine of its ten largest 
insurance claims (Delphi’s being the tenth) shows the agency making 
assessments similar to those it made for the Delphi pension plans. In 
each case, we found that PBGC evaluated the future viability of the plans 
when making such decisions. For example, PBGC considered the 
likelihood of the company securing investment or more generally exiting 
bankruptcy as the plan’s sponsor, or, alternatively, of an asset purchaser 
assuming the plan. PBGC also assessed future plan funding. For 
example, staff recommended termination of Weirton Steel’s plan 
expecting that plan funding would soon decline. Weirton Steel, pursuing 
two tracks to exit bankruptcy, both of which assumed plan termination, 
filed an emergency motion seeking court approval to lay off 175 
management employees, which would have triggered additional benefits 
totaling up to $270 million. PBGC expected the layoffs to significantly 
reduce the funding of Weirton’s already underfunded pension plan and 
terminated the pension plan before the plan’s funding was affected. 
 
As GM’s primary lender in bankruptcy, Treasury played a significant role 
in helping GM resolve the Delphi bankruptcy in terms of GM’s interests. 
Treasury’s guiding principle was to see the bankruptcy resolved with the 
least possible amount of investment by GM while still preserving GM’s 
supply chain. However, with regard to GM decisions about the Delphi 
pension plans—their sponsorship and the decision to honor existing top-
up agreements—court filings and statements from GM and Treasury 
officials support that Treasury deferred to GM’s business judgment. 
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to Resolve the Delphi 
Bankruptcy 
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According to Treasury officials, Treasury agreed with GM’s assessment 
that the company could not afford the potential costs of sponsoring the 
Delphi hourly plan. With regard to the top-ups, Treasury officials said that 
while Treasury did not explicitly approve or disprove of GM’s agreement 
to honor previously negotiated top-up agreements with some unions, it 
agreed that GM had solid commercial reasons to enter into such 
agreement. Similarly, PBGC officials have maintained that their agency’s 
decision to terminate the Delphi plans was made independent of input 
from Treasury. 
From Treasury’s initial discussions about Delphi’s pensions with PBGC in 
April 2009 until after GM’s bankruptcy filing on June 1, 2009, Treasury 
had anticipated that Delphi’s salaried pension plan would be terminated 
by PBGC, but that GM would assume the remaining portion of Delphi’s 
hourly plan, as called for in phase 2 of the September 2008 agreement. 
With respect to the salaried plan, according to Treasury officials, Treasury 
agreed with GM’s rationale not to assume the now underfunded Delphi 
salaried plan, since that plan had been fully funded when GM transferred 
it to Delphi in 1999.35 With respect to the hourly plan, however, a 
Treasury official’s deposition indicates that Treasury thought it was 
reasonable for GM to assume the Delphi hourly plan for UAW-
represented workers, given the UAW’s continuing role with the new GM 
and the fact that the hourly plan, which covered both the UAW and other 
union-represented workers, had not been fully funded at the time the plan 
was transferred from GM to Delphi in 1999.36
According to our review of the records, Treasury was involved in 
discussions with PBGC and GM prior to GM’s bankruptcy filing, on how to 
address Delphi’s pensions. Specifically, according to the Treasury 
official’s deposition, initial discussions with PBGC, GM, and Treasury in 
 
                                                                                                                       
35According to data provided by Delphi, based on a fair market valuation of plan assets 
the Delphi salaried plan was 108.8 percent funded as of year-end 1998 and 122.7 percent 
funded as of year-end 1999. (“Fully funded” means that as of a particular date, plan assets 
equal or exceed the relevant measure of plan obligations.) However, for the typical 
pension plan invested in a mix of stocks and bonds, measures of funded status can be 
highly volatile, so that a plan that is fully funded on one date could be substantially less 
than fully funded on a subsequent date 
36According to the deposition, Treasury was not focused on the other unions’ plans at this 
time but was concerned about UAW because of UAW’s role for new GM. According to 
data from Delphi, the hourly plan was 69.1 percent funded as of year-end 1999, 
measuring assets on a fair market value basis.  
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April and May 2009 centered on trying to reach an agreement under 
which, among other things, the Delphi salaried plan would be terminated 
and GM would assume the hourly pension plan. According to the 
deposition, as of May 28, 2009, there was a general agreement with 
PBGC that, if GM had been willing to take on the hourly plan, the salaried 
plan would be terminated and PBGC would have an administrative claim 
on the Delphi bankruptcy. In exchange, PBGC would release the liens on 
Delphi’s foreign assets and have an unsecured claim for an undefined 
amount. According to PBGC officials, there were discussions in April and 
May 2009 around the topic of how to deal with Delphi’s pension plans in 
light of the collapse of the auto market and growing concerns about 
Delphi’s inability to maintain its pension plans and imminent liquidation, 
as well as GM’s own financial difficulties and impending bankruptcy. 
However, PBGC officials told us that at this time, they had not reached 
any agreement with GM or Delphi regarding the future of the Delphi 
pension plans or settlement of PBGC liens and other claims that might 
arise from the termination of one or more of Delphi’s pension plans. 
According to court filings, GM officials first informed Treasury that they 
had concerns about taking on the hourly plan and had not built the cost of 
doing so into its restructuring plan on June 3, 2009—shortly after GM’s 
bankruptcy filing. In June 2009, GM developed and provided Treasury 
with an assessment of the costs of Delphi’s pensions, which explained 
that the restructuring plan did not assume the transfer of remaining Delphi 
hourly or salaried plans. The assessment also stated that, subject to 
certain conditions, GM was obligated to absorb the second transfer of 
Delphi’s hourly plan but did not expect Delphi to meet those conditions.37 
GM also noted that it was not obligated to absorb Delphi’s salaried plans. 
After reviewing GM’s calculations and engaging in discussions with GM’s 
pension team, Treasury agreed with GM’s assessment that taking on the 
Delphi hourly plan was a “3 billion dollar liability that General Motors could 
not afford.”38
                                                                                                                       
37The assessment added that the since the first transfer in September 2008, the unfunded 
liability for the remainder of Delphi’s hourly plan had increased from $1.5 billion to 
approximately $3.2 to 3.5 billion as of March 31, 2009 
 In a legal brief, Treasury has asserted that the department 
38Upon termination in July 2009, PBGC calculated that the hourly plan underfunding 
totaled $4.4 billion.  
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did not dictate what should be done with the Delphi pensions and that 
Treasury agreed with GM’s decisions.39
According to PBGC, Treasury did not play an active role in PBGC’s 
decision to terminate the Delphi plans, although the Secretary of the 
Treasury is one of PBGC’s three PBGC board members. Specifically, 
according to PBGC officials, PBGC’s director informed the board of 
PBGC’s decision to seek termination of the Delphi plans, gave the board 
advance notice of its subsequent implementation of that decision, and 
routinely kept the board informed of the agency’s actions in the Delphi 
bankruptcy case, consistent with PBGC’s practice in other large cases. 
The law gives the board responsibility to establish and oversee PBGC 
policies,
 
40 but according to PBGC, the board decides broad policy issues 
that may arise from cases without getting involved directly in those cases. 
For their part, Treasury officials acknowledged that the department had 
multiple roles in this process by virtue of its roles in PBGC oversight and 
in managing the U.S. investment in new GM, but noted that Treasury 
does not communicate with PBGC about its GM investment activities.41 
Moreover, in response to questions from Congress, the Treasury 
Secretary stated that Treasury did not make the decision to terminate 
Delphi’s pension plans.42
Although GM decided not to assume the second installment of Delphi’s 
hourly plan, it did decide to honor existing top-up agreements for 
commercial reasons that Treasury found reasonable. As noted in a 
Treasury official’s deposition, during GM’s bankruptcy process, GM was 
prepared to honor the obligation of providing top-ups to Delphi UAW 
retirees, while the situation was less clear regarding comparable 
agreements with IUE and USWA. GM officials told us that the company 
agreed to honor the top-up agreement with the UAW during its 
restructuring because of its dependence on the union, whose members 
 
                                                                                                                       
39Mot. Def. U.S. Dep’t Treas,., Pres. Task Force on Auto Indus., Timothy F. Geithner, 
Steven L. Rattner, Ron. A. Bloom, Dis., or Alt. Summ. J. at 24, Black v. PBGC, No. 2:09-
cv-13616-AJT-DAS (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2010). 
4029 U.S.C. § 1302(d) and (f). 
41GAO-10-492.  
42The Federal Bailout of AIG: Hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, 111th Cong. (2010) (answers to questions for the record from 
Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury). 
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made up a substantial part of GM’s workforce. GM agreed to provide top-
ups to the Delphi UAW retirees as part of GM’s master sale and purchase 
agreement, to which Treasury gave its approval.43
While new GM maintained that it was not obligated to provide top-ups to 
Delphi IUE and USWA retirees, it did have reason to want to resolve 
Delphi’s bankruptcy, given GM’s reliance on Delphi for parts.
 The agreement did not 
include top-ups for IUE and USWA-represented employees, nor for the 
splinter unions or the salaried employees, who had no previous top-up 
agreements with GM. 
44
                                                                                                                       
43In re General Motors Corp, 407 B.R. 463, 481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Decision on 
debtor’s motion for approval of (1) sale of assets to Vehicle Acquisitions Holdings LLC; (2) 
assumption and assignment of related executory contracts; and (3) entry into UAW retiree 
settlement agreement). The master sale and purchase agreement outlined, among other 
things, the assets being sold by old GM to new GM and the liabilities being assumed by new 
GM from old GM.  
 Moreover, 
IUE and USWA, which still represented part of Delphi’s workforce, 
needed to give their consent to finalize the sale of assets in Delphi’s 
bankruptcy. According to a GM official’s court declaration, a prolonged 
cessation in the supply of parts from Delphi to GM would have had a 
“devastating effect on GM, its ability to reorganize, and the communities 
that depend on employment by GM and its community of parts 
44According to a July 2009 declaration of a GM official, since the spin-off from GM, Delphi 
was GM’s largest component parts supplier, accounting for approximately 11.3 percent of 
GM’s North American purchases and 9.6 percent of GM’s global purchases in 2008. 
Declaration of Randall L. Pappal in Support of Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Order 
Approving (I) Master Disposition Agreement for Purchase of Certain assets of Delphi 
Corp., (II) Related agreements, (III) Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts, 
(IV) Agreement with PBGC, and (V) Entry into Alternative Transaction in Lieu Thereof, at 
4, In re General Motors Corp., No. 09-50026 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009).  
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suppliers.”45 According to a Treasury official’s deposition, Treasury was 
kept apprised of GM’s ongoing bargaining with IUE and USWA on a 
variety of issues, including the top-ups.46
Although Treasury officials said that Treasury did not explicitly approve or 
disapprove of GM providing top-ups to the Delphi UAW, USWA, and IUE 
retirees, Treasury did subsequently comment on GM’s decision. In a legal 
brief, Treasury stated that GM had solid commercial reasons for providing 
the top-ups.
 Additionally, according to 
Treasury officials, Treasury’s consent for transactions greater than $100 
million, which had been required prior to GM’s bankruptcy, was not 
required of new GM and therefore, was not required when the settlement 
agreement was signed, 2 months after new GM began operations. 
Negotiations resulted in an agreement, on September 10, 2009, between 
new GM, old GM, IUE, and USWA that, among other things, honored the 
top-ups to the retirees of Delphi who were represented by these unions 
and who were covered by the 1999 top-up agreements. According to the 
agreement, the parties entered into it after consideration of the factual 
and legal arguments regarding these issues, as well as the costs, risks, 
and delays associated with litigating these issues. 
47
                                                                                                                       
45Declaration of Randall L. Pappal in Support of Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Order 
Approving (I) Master Disposition Agreement for Purchase of Certain assets of Delphi 
Corp., (II) Related agreements, (III) Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts, 
(IV) Agreement with PBGC, and (V) Entry into Alternative Transaction in Lieu Thereof at 4, 
In re General Motors Corp., No.09-50026 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009). The declaration 
stated that Delphi was a sole-source, just-in-time supplier of many critical parts to GM, 
including parts that are used in almost every GM product line in North America and 
identified several ways that a cessation of parts delivery by Delphi could affect GM, 
including that (1) most parts that Delphi manufactures for GM are not readily available 
from an alternate source, and while GM could accelerate efforts to resource Delphi parts 
in the event of a supply interruption, the sheer magnitude of the parts to be resourced and 
revalidation required would take at least several months to achieve; (2) because GM 
operates on a just-in-time inventory delivery system, GM plants relying on just-in-time 
shipments may run out of inventory of such parts and have to shut down within a matter of 
days, if Delphi ever ceased shipping even a small fraction of production parts to GM; and 
(3) the shutdown of GM plants as a result of termination of deliveries of affected parts from 
Delphi could idle tens of thousands of GM workers, significantly decrease GM’s revenues, 
and increase GM’s costs to expedite resourcing efforts.  
 Specifically, Treasury stated that its aim in negotiating the 
details of GM’s reorganization plan was to ensure that new GM would 
assume only those liabilities of old GM that were “commercially 
46Deposition of Treasury Official, No. 04-44481 (RDD) (S.D. N.Y. July 21, 2009).  
47Mot. Def. U.S. Dep’t Treas. at 28.  
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necessary” in order for new GM to operate. Treasury noted in the brief 
that because of new GM’s dependence on the UAW workforce and the 
costs, risks, and delays associated with litigating USWA’s and IUE’s 
claims related to the Delphi bankruptcy, new GM had solid commercial 
reasons to agree to provide the top-ups to the Delphi UAW, USWA, and 
IUE retirees. Additionally, Treasury officials noted that, unlike the hourly 
plan, the salaried plan was fully funded at the time GM transferred it to 
Delphi, and that because GM was never obligated to provide top-ups to 
the salaried or other retirees not represented by UAW, IUE, and USWA. 
As a result of GM’s decisions to pay top-up benefits to those participants 
covered by the agreements and to take back a portion of the Delphi 
hourly plan in September 2008, GM will bear some of the costs of 
Delphi’s unfunded pension liabilities (see fig. 1). Retirees who experience 
benefit reductions that are not topped up by GM will also bear a portion of 
the cost through their reduced benefits. However, PBGC will bear the 
biggest burden—about $6 billion in unfunded guaranteed benefits across 
all six of Delphi’s DB plans. 
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Figure 1: Who Is Bearing the Cost of Delphi Pension Plans’ Unfunded Liabilities 
aGM estimated the cost for top-up benefits in December 2010. GM’s top-up estimate is higher than 
PBGC’s estimate for the hourly plan’s total amount of unfunded nonguaranteed benefits because GM 
will pay some benefits not included in PBGC’s calculations. For example, unlike PBGC’s estimate, 
GM’s estimate includes obligations to provide up to 7 years of accrued benefits for certain employees 
covered under the top-up agreement who were not eligible to retire as of the plan termination date, 
but who became (or will become) eligible to retire under a normal or voluntary retirement during this 
7-year window. In addition, GM’s estimate includes obligations to provide covered employees who 
retired under the mutually satisfactory retirement (MSR) option, for which GM will pay the difference 
between the PBGC deferred vested pension benefit and the Delphi MSR benefit amount. 
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PBGC took actions during Delphi’s bankruptcy to protect plan funding and 
recover assets from Delphi, eventually recovering between $600 and 
$650 million against the $7.2 billion in total unfunded plan benefits. PBGC 
negotiated value for its claims and liens with Delphi and GM, releasing 
them for a settlement generating cash and other recoveries. The process 
for distributing these recoveries is laid out in ERISA,48 PBGC 
regulations,49
 
 policies, and procedures. Because of the large gap 
between plan assets and liabilities in Delphi’s plans relative to PBGC’s 
recoveries, its recoveries are expected to have only a modest impact on 
the benefits of only some participants. 
Upon the termination and trusteeship of an underfunded single-employer 
plan, PBGC generally takes control of all plan assets, but PBGC also has 
authority to recover additional money from company assets outside of its 
pension plans. ERISA provides that when underfunded single-employer 
plan is terminated, the plan sponsor and other entities under common 
control (the controlled group)50 are “jointly and severally”51 liable to PBGC 
for any unpaid premiums52 and the amount of any unfunded benefit 
liability.53 In addition, a plan sponsor is required under ERISA to 
periodically make certain minimum contributions to its plan,54 and—along 
with other members of the controlled group—is liable to a plan for any 
required contributions not made by the date due.55
                                                                                                                       
4829 U.S.C. § 1344. 
 
49See 29 C.F.R. pt. 4044 (2011). 
50The controlled group consists of the plan sponsor and other entities under common 
control, determined generally as prescribed under 26 U.S.C. § 1563(a), 29 U.S.C. § 
1301(a)(14), and 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(b)-1 (2011). 
51Joint and several liability is when a creditor may sue one or more of the parties 
separately, or sue all of them. 
5229 U.S.C. §1307(c). 
5329 U.S.C. § 1362(a). 
5429 U.S.C. §§ 1082 and 1083. 
5529 U.S.C. § 1082(b)(1) and (2). 
PBGC Pursued Claims 
on Delphi’s Assets, 
Resulting in between 
$600 Million and $650 
Million in Recoveries 
PBGC Pursued Statutory 
Claims Arising against 
Delphi’s Assets 
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ERISA imposes a lien that can only be officially filed (“perfected”)56 by 
PBGC on behalf of a plan in the amount of the aggregate missed 
contribution payments, when the total of those missed payments exceeds 
$1 million.57 PBGC first filed liens on behalf of the Delphi plans, for 
missed required contributions of $75,177,000, in March 2006.58 From 
2006 to 2009, PBGC filed liens on behalf of the Delphi plans in response 
to Delphi’s failing to contribute to its plans in the amounts required by 
statutory minimum funding standards. As of the termination of the Delphi 
plans in July 2009, PBGC held $195.9 million in perfected liens on behalf 
of the salaried plan and a combined $9.2 million on behalf of Delphi’s 
smaller pension plans, for a total of $205 million in secured claims. PBGC 
officials told us they filed these liens for missed contributions only on the 
assets of Delphi’s foreign subsidiaries because Delphi’s domestic assets 
were shielded from PBGC liens by the automatic stay in Delphi’s 
bankruptcy.59
                                                                                                                       
56A lien is perfected by filing it as prescribed in the relevant jurisdiction. Perfecting a lien 
provides constructive notice of its existence to all third parties and gives it priority over any 
later-perfected liens. In a bankruptcy, a properly perfected lien becomes a secured claim; 
an unperfected lien is treated the same as a general unsecured claims. All creditors with 
secured claims must receive payment in full (or up to the total value of their security) 
before those with general unsecured claims receive any payment at all. 
 In addition, prior to the transfer of $2.1 billion in net 
liabilities to GM’s hourly plan, PBGC also held liens on behalf of Delphi’s 
hourly plan, reflecting missed required contributions to that plan. 
However, according to PBGC, the transfer of a portion of Delphi’s hourly 
plan in September 2008 eliminated the hourly plan’s accumulated funding 
deficiency, eliminating the legal basis for any liens for missed 
contributions up to that point in time. Following the transfer, the 
contribution due to Delphi’s hourly plan for the final plan year was $194 
million. However, according to PBGC officials, because no quarterly 
contributions were due, that final $194 million catch-up payment was not 
due until June 15, 2010, well after the plan was terminated, and therefore, 
a lien did not arise. 
5729 U.S.C. § 1083(k). 
58The Internal Revenue Code requires single employer plan sponsors to make a certain 
amount of periodic contributions to their DB plans and maintain minimum funding 
standards. 26 U.S.C. § 412. 
59Filing for bankruptcy operates as an automatic stay barring anyone from, among other 
things, perfecting or enforcing liens against the filing party. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). 
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ERISA also establishes a lien on behalf of PBGC in the amount of any 
unfunded benefit liability as of the plan’s termination date, up to an 
amount not in excess of 30 percent of the controlled group’s net worth60
 
 
However, when a firm is in bankruptcy—as was the case with Delphi—
PBGC is barred from perfecting a lien under this provision. According to 
PBGC officials, although liens could have arisen under this provision on 
Delphi’s foreign controlled group members after the Delphi plans were 
terminated, they concluded that PBGC could maximize recoveries by 
achieving a settlement prior to termination, in part because they were 
concerned about the potential breakup of Delphi’s controlled group and 
the impact this would have on recoveries. 
According to information from PBGC, in May 2009, PBGC, Delphi, GM 
and Treasury met to discuss the status of negotiations surrounding 
Delphi’s bankruptcy, including the pension plans. Treasury participated in 
those negotiations as the facilitator between GM and PBGC regarding 
Delphi pension issues.61According to a GM official’s court declaration, 
neither GM nor presumably any other potential purchaser was willing to 
purchase Delphi’s assets while they were subject to the threat of liens 
PBGC held on behalf of the underfunded Delphi plans. Therefore, GM’s 
obligations to Delphi were conditioned upon PBGC agreeing to remove 
these liens on Delphi’s assets. During the negotiations, GM recognized 
that it might be necessary for it to make a cash payment to the PBGC or 
assume some portion of Delphi’s unfunded pension liabilities. GM noted it 
would only make such a payment if necessary to help Delphi’s 
reorganization and the payment was clearly outweighed by the benefits 
GM would receive from Delphi’s reorganization. GM also noted that any 
contributions under an agreement with PBGC would be subject to 
Treasury’s consent if funds in a restricted escrow account, over which 
Treasury held approval rights, would be used for such contributions.62
                                                                                                                       
6029 U.S.C. § 1368. 
 
61Deposition of Treasury Official, No. 04-44481 (RDD) (S.D. N.Y. July 21, 2009).  
62Of the $30.1 billion that Treasury provided to GM at its bankruptcy filing, $16.4 billion 
was held in escrow to be accessed by GM on an as-needed basis with the consent of 
Treasury. In October 2009, Treasury approved GM’s request for approximately $3 billion 
from this account for transactions related to the resolution of the Delphi bankruptcy. 
According to GM, this amount included the $70 million payment that GM made as part of 
its agreement with PBGC. 
PBGC Negotiated the 
Value of Its Claims with 
Delphi and GM 
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PBGC and Delphi reached an agreement on July 21, 2009, and PBGC 
announced it was terminating Delphi’s plans the following day. PBGC 
received a membership interest in new Delphi, which gave it rights to 
some of the initial profit distributions from post-bankruptcy Delphi. PBGC 
actuaries valued the interest at $500 to $600 million. GM also paid PBGC 
$70 million in cash. In exchange, PBGC released $205 million in liens on 
Delphi’s foreign assets (which PBGC considered worth substantial 
negotiating leverage in maximizing recoveries) and released Delphi 
controlled group members from any potential future PBGC claim that 
might arise against them under any circumstances. PBGC also settled 
with Delphi and received a $3 billion general unsecured claim in Delphi’s 
bankruptcy in exchange for releasing all of its other claims in the case 
(see fig. 2). 
In March 2011, PBGC redeemed its membership interest from new Delphi 
for $594 million. Soon after, in April 2011, PBGC sold its remaining $3 
billion general unsecured claim against old Delphi to Credit Suisse Loan 
Funding, LLC for $53 million—roughly 2 cents on the dollar. Together, 
PBGC’s recoveries of Delphi Corporation assets totaled approximately 
$717 million—or an estimated $600 million to $650 million when 
discounted to its value as of the date of plan termination, as required 
under ERISA.63
                                                                                                                       
6329 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(1). 
 Based on these values, recovery ratios for Delphi’s hourly 
and salaried plans are estimated to ultimately be just over 6 percent. 
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Figure 2: PBGC Asset Recoveries in Delphi’s Bankruptcy 
The recovery ratios in Delphi’s case are comparable to those we found in 
the nine other companies on PBGC’s top-10 list of largest claims, although 
the circumstances surrounding each recovery process are unique. As it did 
in Delphi’s case, PBGC had claims on non-debtor corporate subsidiaries in 
recovery efforts against three other large terminations we examined: 
Weirton Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and National Steel. Also, as it did with 
Delphi, PBGC entered into a negotiated settlement agreement with eight of 
the other nine companies on PBGC’s top-10 list of largest claims.64
We reviewed documents for the 29 plans across these nine firms, and 
found that the recovery ratios ranged from 0 percent to 38.5 percent. 
 
                                                                                                                       
64The companies we reviewed, 5 airlines and 4 steel companies and Delphi, are single-
employer pension plan firms with the 10 highest claims on PBGC from 1975 through 2010. 
Among them they sponsored a total of 35 DB plans. See appendix III for a summary of 
PBGC recoveries for terminated plans of these firms. In addition to these terminations we 
also reviewed the terminations of the Collins & Aikman Corporation and Hayes Lemmerz 
International, Inc., because as it did in Delphi’s case, PBGC filed liens on foreign 
subsidiaries of those companies. 
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Recovery ratios appeared to vary by industry for the other nine 
companies, all of which are airlines or steel companies. Of the 13 
terminated steel plans we reviewed, 9 had PBGC recovery ratios less 
than 3 percent, and of the 11 large airline plans we reviewed, 8 had 
recovery ratios over 8 percent. We also found that PBGC generally 
achieved higher recovery ratios for plans of companies that were in a 
position to emerge from bankruptcy after their plans’ termination than 
those of companies positioned to sell their assets or liquidate. 
We also sought to compare PBGC’s recovery efforts against Delphi with 
other terminations involving companies with foreign assets. In response 
to our request for cases involving foreign liens, PBGC did not identify any 
of the firms involving their 10 largest claims,65 but instead provided two 
other case examples. In one case, Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc., 
PBGC entered into a settlement (along with the other creditors) for claims 
on the company’s foreign subsidiaries to recover funds on behalf of the 
company’s pension plan. PBGC’s claims in this case total $113.1 million, 
and expected recoveries total $21.7 million, about 19 cents per dollar 
claimed. In the other case, Collins & Aikman Corporation, the company’s 
Canadian and Mexican subsidiaries represented a potentially large 
portion of the net worth in the controlled group. As in Delphi’s case, 
PBGC terminated the Collins & Aikman’s pension plan when it expected 
that these foreign assets would leave the controlled group and reduce 
PBGC recoveries. PBGC’s claims in this case total $225.2 million, and 
recoveries total $8.7 million, a recovery ratio of less than 4 percent.66
 
 
A fraction of PBGC’s $600 million to $650 million in recoveries will go to 
increase participant benefits beyond the level already guaranteed by 
PBGC, with the rest offsetting PBGC’s payment of unfunded guaranteed 
benefits. Recoveries of due and unpaid employer contributions are 
allocated back to the pension plans to which they are owed. Based on the 
liens for missed contributions to the Delphi plans, PBGC will allocate 
                                                                                                                       
65One of the companies on the top-10 list, Delta Airlines, did have foreign subsidiaries in 
its controlled group and not in bankruptcy, but according to PBGC officials, these 
subsidiaries were relatively small and could not provide PBGC substantial recoveries. 
Therefore, PBGC did not file foreign liens in that case. 
66As others have noted, PBGC’s authority to recover on liens abroad is not without some 
constraints. Allan E. Reznick and A. Owen Glist, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.—
Controlled Group Claims Abroad, 235 N.Y. L.J. No. 33 (2006). 
Recoveries Will Result in 
Minimal Benefit Increases 
beyond Guaranteed 
Benefit Amounts 
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$195.9 million of its recoveries to the salaried plan, and $9.2 million to the 
smaller plans from its recoveries (see fig. 3). 
Figure 3: Distribution of Asset Recoveries by PBGC in Delphi’s Bankruptcy 
aPlan assets distributed to unfunded guaranteed and nonguaranteed benefits, but under different 
rules than asset recoveries. 
 
The remaining recoveries, estimated to be between $395 and $445 
million, are allocated among the plans proportionally according to each 
plan’s percentage of total remaining unfunded benefit liabilities.67 The 
money allocated to each plan is then split between PBGC (to offset its 
cost of paying unfunded guaranteed benefits) and participants (to pay a 
portion of unfunded benefits beyond ERISA’s guarantee limits). For plans 
with more than $20 million in unfunded benefit liabilities, as in the case of 
Delphi’s hourly and salaried plans, the percentage of participants’ 
nonguaranteed benefits PBGC pays depends on the percentage of the 
plans’ unfunded benefit liability PBGC is able to recover.68
                                                                                                                       
6729 U.S.C. §§ 1322(c) and 1344(f). 
 Remaining 
6829 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2)(C). For plans with less than $20 million in unfunded benefit 
liabilities, the split between PBGC and participant benefits is determined by PBGC’s small 
plan recovery ratio, an average of PBGC’s recoveries over a 5-year period (29 U.S.C. 
1344(f)(2)(A)). In 2009, this ratio was set at 3.85 percent.  
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recoveries go to offset PBGC’s loss for paying guaranteed benefits. With 
recoveries of about 6 percent of unfunded liabilities for both Delphi’s 
hourly and salaried plans, PBGC would pay about 6 percent of all 
participant unfunded nonguaranteed plan benefits, which are those 
benefits funded neither by plan assets nor guaranteed by PBGC. PBGC 
officials said it is too early in the benefit determination process to develop 
an accurate estimate of total unfunded, non-guaranteed benefits, but at 
this point, PBGC expects that recoveries will slightly increase benefits for 
some participants across Delphi’s plans. 
 
The benefits provided by PBGC must comply with the limits on guaranteed 
benefits under ERISA, and as a result, the amount guaranteed and paid by 
PBGC to some Delphi retirees will be less than the amounts promised by 
Delphi. However, some Delphi hourly plan participants avoided these 
reductions because they were transferred into GM’s plan prior to PBGC’s 
termination of the Delphi plan. Some of the other hourly plan participants 
who will receive less from PBGC than the amount promised by Delphi will 
have their losses covered by GM because of top-up agreements originally 
negotiated when Delphi was spun off from GM. These participants will 
receive additional payments from GM resulting in their receiving, in total, 
their full promised benefits. But most Delphi employees are not covered by 
these top-up agreements—including about 40 percent of the participants in 
the hourly plan, and all the participants in the salaried and other four 
smaller plans. PBGC’s data showed that, as a result of the ERISA limits, 
PBGC has had to reduce benefits for just under half of salaried and hourly 
plan participants already retired and receiving pension payments, 
according to information collected by DSRA. 
 
As of June 2011, after reviewing the benefits promised to and being paid 
to the vast majority of Delphi hourly and salaried participants already 
retired, PBGC data indicate that just under half required reductions in 
their estimated benefit in order to comply with ERISA limits (see table 
3).69
                                                                                                                       
69When PBGC becomes trustee of a terminated plan, it pays participants already retired 
and receiving pension payments estimated benefits until it can determine the correct 
benefits participants should receive under ERISA.  
 According to the data, 48 percent of hourly retirees and 45 percent of 
the salaried retirees had their estimated benefits reduced because of 
Many Delphi Retirees 
Are Subject to Benefit 
Reductions and Only 
Certain Hourly 
Retirees Are 
Protected by Union 
Agreements with GM 
ERISA Limits Result in 
Reductions in Benefits for 
Many Retirees 
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guarantee limits.70 Like those affected by other large terminations, Delphi 
participants who had retired early or had accrued higher benefits were 
likely to have their benefits reduced due to ERISA limits. For example, 
retirees in both plans frequently had benefit reductions because of 
ERISA’s accrued-at-normal limit, which can eliminate or substantially 
reduce any early retirement supplemental benefits.71 Only salaried 
retirees had a high proportion of retirees receiving reductions because of 
ERISA’s maximum limit, with 26 percent of them exceeding this limit 
compared with 2 percent of hourly retirees.72
Table 3: Number and Percentage of Delphi Retirees Subject to Reductions in Estimated Benefits Due to ERISA Limits (as of 
June 1, 2011) 
 Even after applying the 
ERISA limits, PBGC expects to pay about $6 billion of the $7.2 billion in 
unfunded benefits promised to Delphi participants, as these benefits fall 
under the limits and thus are guaranteed. 
Delphi plana 
Number of 
participants 
Number of participants  
with benefits reviewed by 
PBGC as of June 1, 2011b 
Number with 
reductions in 
benefits 
Percent reviewed 
with reductionsb 
Percent reviewed 
with no reductionsb 
Hourly plan 47,176 28,051 13,368 48 52 
Salaried plan 20,203 8,273 3,714 45 55 
Source: GAO analysis of PBGC data. 
aIn addition to the hourly and salaried plans, Delphi also has four other small plans. (See appendix II 
for estimated benefit reductions for all Delphi plans.) 
bAccording to PBGC officials, as of June 2011, they had not yet reviewed the benefit amounts for 
about 2,000 of the 30,000 hourly plan participants already receiving payment, but had reviewed the 
benefit amounts for all other salaried plan participants already receiving payments. These rates are 
also subject to change as PBGC determines the impact of plan asset recoveries on retirees’ benefits 
and as more workers retire and receive estimated reductions and final benefit determinations over the 
next year or more. 
                                                                                                                       
70The proportion of Delphi retirees who have had their benefits reduced by each of 
ERISA’s benefit limits as of June 2011 is provided in appendix II. 
71Under ERISA, the accrued-at-normal limit permits little if any early retirement or supplemental 
benefits to be paid. It provides for benefits to be paid at the plan’s normal retirement age, which 
is 65 years old, as a straight-life annuity (that is, a periodic payment for the life of the retiree, 
with no additional payments to survivors). 29 C.F.R. § 4022.21 (2011). 
72ERISA’s maximum limit guarantees payment of benefits up to a federal statutory maximum 
(29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3)), adjusted annually, based on the year the plan terminates. 29 
C.F.R. § 4022.23 (2011). When Delphi’s plans terminated in 2009, the maximum limit was 
$54,000 per year for a person retiring at age 65 and with no survivor benefit. The maximum 
is actuarially lower for those retiring under age 65 or with a survivor benefit. 
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Based on PBGC’s reviews as of June 2011, a higher proportion of Delphi 
retirees have been subject to the guarantee limits compared with retirees 
of most other large plans terminated and trusteed by PBGC. While PBGC 
does not systematically track the number of participants affected by 
guaranteed benefit limits, a study it conducted in 2008 using a sample of 
large plans showed that ERISA benefit limits resulted in 16 percent of 
participants receiving reductions. It also found that the steel and airline 
plans, which tend to allow early retirement and have generous benefits, 
had a higher percentage of participants experiencing reductions, at 21 
percent for steel plans and 22 percent for airline plans. Although certain 
plans for pilots have had 60 percent of participants receiving reductions, 
Delphi’s current rates of 45 percent of salaried plan participants and 48 
percent of hourly plan participants are higher than most. However, over 
time, the proportion of Delphi retirees with benefit reductions is likely to 
decline. According to PBGC, many participants from the salaried plan 
who were not eligible to retire as of the termination date were not entitled 
under the plan to benefit supplements or benefit payments larger than 
ERISA’s maximum limit. Also, some workers eligible for these benefits 
may choose to wait longer to retire to try to avoid or mitigate the amount 
of benefit reductions. 
Recoveries can also mitigate possible benefit losses that have not been 
guaranteed by PBGC. As PBGC is still in the early stages of valuing the 
plan, it has not fully determined the extent to which recoveries will impact 
participants’ unfunded nonguaranteed benefits. According to a PBGC 
official, preliminary estimates suggest that PBGC recoveries allocated to 
Delphi participants’ benefits will lessen the extent of benefit reductions for 
some participants with benefits at the top of the statutory allocation 
priority category 3—that is, those who were retired (or were eligible to 
retire) at least 3 years prior to the date of plan termination for the salaried 
plan.73
                                                                                                                       
73For terminated underfunded plans, ERISA establishes a detailed process for allocating 
plan assets and PBGC recoveries to participants’ benefits based on six priority categories. 
For further details, see appendix III. As discussed in the prior section, the recoveries 
allocated to participants for unfunded and nonguaranteed benefits do not include any of 
the recoveries for “due and unpaid employer contributions,” which are allocated back to 
the pension plans to which they were owed and allocated with plan assets rather than 
recoveries.    
 Most of the other large plans we reviewed had sufficient assets 
and recoveries to partially or fully fund this priority category. (See app. III 
for the allocation of plan assets and recoveries to the priority categories 
for other large terminations we reviewed.) 
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As for the magnitude of benefit reductions, PBGC could not provide 
summary information on the range of retirees’ losses. However, according 
to DSRA officials, information they collected indicates that salaried 
retirees under 65 years of age were at risk for “significant pension 
reductions.” DSRA requested information on losses from approximately 
4,000 salaried retirees who may have received reductions in benefits as 
of the first quarter of 2010. The 1,703 who responded (or about 8 percent 
of all salaried plan participants) reported losses in benefits ranging from 5 
percent to 60 percent, with more than 90 percent having losses of 10 
percent to 40 percent.74
 
 Our review of a small judgmental sample of 
reductions for seven salaried retirees showed a range of pension losses 
from 12 percent to 40 percent. The salaried retiree who had a 12 percent 
drop in pension benefits lost $349 per month (a decline from $2,944.25 to 
$2,595.15 per month) due to the loss of a substantial portion of his early 
retirement supplemental benefit. The salaried retiree who had a 40 
percent drop in pension benefits lost $1,490.67 per month (a decline from 
$3,732.63 to $2,241.96 per month) due to the loss of benefits in excess of 
the maximum limit based on his age at retirement and his annuity that 
provided survivor benefits. 
Agreements negotiated between GM and various Delphi unions have 
protected certain participants in Delphi’s hourly plan from benefit loss due 
to termination of their underfunded plan. These agreements include the 
arrangement that resulted in the transfer of 14,413 (about 22 percent) of 
Delphi’s hourly plan participants back to GM’s hourly plan in September 
2008, as well as the provision of pension top-ups covering reductions in 
benefits resulting from the application of ERISA limits.75
In 2007 and 2008, as part of Delphi’s bankruptcy and restructuring plan at 
the time, GM and Delphi negotiated agreements to transfer the Delphi 
hourly plan participants’ pensions back into GM’s hourly plan in two 
 But most Delphi 
employees are not protected by these agreements—including a 
substantial portion of hourly plan participants and all the participants in 
the salaried plan and other smaller Delphi pension plans. 
                                                                                                                       
74We could not verify the accuracy of information collected by DSRA nor could we perform 
any statistical analyses to determine the significance of the results. 
75For a summary and timeline of events surrounding the creation of the union agreements 
and the termination of Delphi plans, see GAO-11-373R. 
Agreements between GM 
and Unions Protect Certain 
Hourly Retirees from 
Benefit Loss 
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installments.76 The unions participated in developing the criteria to select 
the pensions to be transferred in the first installment, which took place in 
September 2008.77 In this transfer, the pensions of about 24 percent 
(14,413 of 60,905) of Delphi’s hourly plan participants were transferred to 
GM’s hourly plan, which assumed the associated $2.1 billion in net 
liabilities for these pensions.78
Furthermore, top-up agreements covering certain hourly workers will 
protect these workers, but not others, from potential losses due to the 
benefit limits in ERISA. In June and August of 2007, GM agreed with 
UAW, IUE, and USWA to extend the top-up agreements originally 
negotiated in 1999 after Delphi’s spinoff from GM. In November 2008, 
Delphi froze its hourly plan, ceasing the accrual of additional benefits 
under the plan and triggering the top-up agreement for covered 
participants.
 As a result, those Delphi plan participants 
whose pensions were transferred were no longer part of Delphi’s plan and 
were therefore protected from any benefit loss resulting from Delphi’s 
subsequent plan termination. 
79
                                                                                                                       
76On September 6, 2007, GM and Delphi signed the first Global Settlement Agreement 
that laid out their plans to transfer pensions from Delphi’s hourly plan to GM’s hourly plan. 
The plans for the second pension transfer are included in Section 2.03 of the Global 
Settlement Agreement between Delphi and GM, dated September 12, 2008.  
 GM negotiated and maintained the top-up agreements with 
the UAW during its bankruptcy and restructuring, as did new GM with the 
IUE and USWA in September 2009. As a result, certain covered hourly 
employees will receive their full promised benefits despite the plan freeze 
and subsequent termination, even if their benefits exceed the guaranteed 
77The criteria and order of Delphi hourly pensions to be transferred was based on 2007 
negotiations between the Unions, Delphi, and GM and contained in paragraph 22(b) of the 
Term Sheet (Attachment B) to the UAW-Delphi-GM Memorandum of Understanding – 
Delphi Restructuring, dated June 22, 2007 (and comparable agreements for the IUE-CWA 
and USWA). The UAW-Delphi-GM Implementation Agreement, dated September 26, 2008 
(and comparable agreements for the IUE-CWA and USWA), supplemented this 
information to include additional criteria. 
78The second installment never took place because Delphi could not meet the agreed 
upon conditions for the transfer. For more information about the Delphi reorganization 
efforts, see GAO-11-373R. 
79In September 2008, Delphi also froze its salaried plan and three smaller qualified DB 
plans to limit all future benefit accruals. For more information on types of freezes and their 
effects, see: GAO, Defined Benefit Pensions: Plan Freezes Affect Millions of Participants 
and May Pose Retirement Income Challenges, GAO-08-817 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 21, 
2008).  
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benefit limits under ERISA. According to data provided by GM, about 60 
percent of the participants in Delphi’s hourly plan as of the date of plan 
termination are potentially covered by GM top-ups if there is any 
reductions in their promised benefits. As of June 2011, GM reported that 
it had paid $221.9 million to 12,638 Delphi retirees and dependents under 
these top-up agreements. 
As indicated in figure 4, however, most Delphi employees are not covered 
by these top-up agreements. No participants in Delphi’s salaried plan or 
other four smaller plans are covered. In addition, about 40 percent of 
Delphi hourly plan participants are also not covered, including anyone 
who never was qualified because they were not members of the unions 
securing these agreements, were not members of the GM hourly plan 
prior to the spinoff, or lost their qualification because they had a break in 
their employment or otherwise lost their seniority. Participants who would 
otherwise be covered, but do not meet the retirement criteria of the plan, 
also will not be provided top-ups, according to GM officials.80
                                                                                                                       
80Pension plans include retirement eligibility criteria that must be met to receive normal or 
early retirement benefits. For instance, a Delphi hourly plan participant must generally be 
of certain age and have sufficient number of credited years of service to retire. For 
example, to get a normal retirement, a participant needs to be 65 years old. To get an 
early retirement, a participant generally needs to be at least 60 years old with 10 years of 
service, have 30 years of credited service, or meet the rule-of-85 (i.e., be at least 55 years 
of age, but not age 60, and have the total of his an age and years of credited service total 
at least 85).  
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Figure 4: Number of Delphi Employees Covered by GM Top-Ups, by Plan 
Note: Delphi hourly plan participants who were not protected by top-up agreements include all those 
who were not members affiliated with UAW, IUE, or USWA and were not previously employed by GM 
prior to the Delphi spin-off. 
 
PBGC will reduce the benefits of all participants in the terminated pension 
plans whose promised benefits exceed ERISA’s guaranteed benefit limits. 
Because of the GM top-up, certain hourly plan participants will have any 
pension benefit reduced because of statutory limits paid to them by GM. 
The combination of the GM top-ups and the 2008 partial plan transfer of 
Delphi’s hourly plan participants to GM have resulted in a much higher 
percentage of salaried plan participants ultimately facing benefit 
reductions than hourly plan participants. Based on the status of PBGC’s 
benefit reviews as of June 2011, 18 percent of the salaried plan 
participants have had their benefits reduced, while only 1 percent of the 
hourly plan participants had reductions that will not be topped up by GM.81 
(See fig. 5.) However, the percentage of hourly participants with 
reductions not topped up by GM is expected to rise over time, as more of 
this group have their benefits reviewed by PBGC. According to PBGC 
officials, no other underfunded pension plan terminated and trusteed by 
PBGC has had a top-up agreement with a parent company comparable to 
these agreements between Delphi and GM. 
                                                                                                                       
81The 18 percent of salaried plan participants with benefit reductions and no top-ups 
represent 45 percent of the retirees with reductions. The 1 percent of hourly plan 
participants with reductions and no top-ups represent 5 percent of the hourly retirees 
reviewed by PBGC with reductions.  
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Figure 5: Status of Benefits for Participants from Delphi’s Hourly and Salaried Plans (as of June 2011) 
 
 
In the course of the Delphi bankruptcy and the termination of its pension 
plans, Delphi employees were notified by Delphi and subsequently by 
PBGC of certain facts, as required by law—namely, of Delphi’s intention 
to defer pension plan contributions and to subsequently freeze the plans, 
and of PBGC’s intention to terminate and trustee the plans, and 
subsequently the effects, when calculated, on individual employee 
pensions. Through their unions, hourly employees received additional 
information, while salaried employees had no formal representative 
through which to receive additional information until they formed DSRA. 
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Delphi notified both hourly and salaried employees in 2006 that it had 
failed to make the minimally-required contribution to their pension plans 
due at that time and that the plans were underfunded by $4.3 billion as of 
December 2004.82 Later in 2006, it also notified its employees, as 
required, that the company had requested a funding waiver for plan year 
2006 from the IRS.83 This notification also included legally required 
information such as a description of the extent to which the plan is 
funded. Similarly, in 2007, Delphi notified the hourly employees of another 
waiver request to defer hourly plan contributions for plan year 2007. 
Subsequently, as required, in October 2008, Delphi notified 
representatives of the unions, UAW, IUE, and USWA, that the hourly plan 
would be frozen as of the end of November 2008 and that participants 
would, consequently, cease accruing additional pension benefits.84 In 
addition, as required, in August of 2008, Delphi also notified salaried 
employees that their plan would be frozen as of the end of September. 
Prior to the termination, Delphi employees did not receive regular 
information from Delphi as to the actual funding status of their plans. 
Under a new federal requirement, such reporting would have been first 
required of Delphi by January 1, 2010—several months after PBGC had 
terminated and trusteed the plans.85 However, Delphi noted that it 
provided its employees with summary plan descriptions, as required.86 
The example summary plan descriptions we obtained for the salaried and 
hourly plans included information about PBGC’s pension insurance 
program and how pension payments could be reduced if the plan 
terminates without enough money to pay all benefits, based on the 
guarantee limits in ERISA and PBGC regulations. 
                                                                                                                       
82ERISA requires plan sponsors to notify employees when the sponsor requests a waiver 
from annual plan funding from the IRS (29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(6)); and to notify employees 
and unions if the sponsor freezes the plan (29 U.S.C. § 1054(h)). 
83The Delphi hourly and salaried plan year was from the beginning of October to the end 
of September of the following calendar year.  
84The splinter unions, IBEW, IAM, and IUOE were also notified in October 2008 that their 
members’ benefits would be frozen as of the end of November 2008.  
85Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 501(a), 120 Stat. 780, 936-39. 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f)) and Employee Benefits Security Administration, Field 
Assistance Bulletin No. 2009-01 at 2 (Feb. 10, 2009). 
8629 U.S.C. § 1022 and 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(m)(1)-(3) (2011). 
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In a July 2009 PBGC press release, PBGC announced the Delphi 
employee pension plans were terminated and the underfunded status of 
the plans. Following termination, PBGC notified Delphi employees of its 
role as statutory trustee of the plans, as required by ERISA.87
As of October 2011, PBGC sent benefit determination letters, informing 
participants of their benefits, to about 10,600 hourly employees and to 
about 50 salaried employees. According to PBGC, letters to many 
salaried employees had been delayed due to coordination with several 
insurers contracted by Delphi to provide annuities. 
 Based on 
official Delphi notices to employees we reviewed, this press release from 
PBGC constituted the first time that employees were apprised of the fact 
that the plans were severely underfunded since the notice from Delphi in 
2006. Following termination in July, PBGC sent Delphi employees letters 
notifying them that if they were eligible and applied to PBGC to begin 
payments, it would begin paying estimated benefits. It also has a toll-free 
telephone number that allows any participant to call PBGC directly with 
questions. PBGC sent Delphi employees a welcome packet and a video 
describing PBGC’s role as trustee. The agency also spoke regularly with 
representatives of DSRA. PBGC met, as well, with union representatives 
of UAW, IUE, and USWA to answer their questions. 
 
As representatives of hourly employees in collective bargaining over 
wages and benefits, the three major unions with whom we spoke—UAW, 
IUE, and USWA—said that they kept their members apprised of changes 
to their benefits and prior agreements, through briefings, letters, and 
through the process of ratification. In addition, their members were 
apprised by GM in January 2010 that the company would honor the top-
up agreements. On the other hand, Delphi’s salaried employees had no 
such union membership or agreement with GM, and received their 
information exclusively from Delphi until just before termination in 
February 2009, when they formed DSRA. 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
8729 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2). 
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The termination of Delphi’s pension plans culminated from a complicated 
and intertwined set of events involving Delphi, GM, various unions, and 
Treasury, as well as PBGC. That some participants will not get the full 
benefits promised to them by their employer is not unusual when 
companies go bankrupt and leave their plans with large unfunded 
liabilities. At the same time, the role that GM and Treasury played in the 
events leading up to termination caused the process to be unusual in 
several respects. Beginning with negotiations related to Delphi’s spin-off 
in 1999, GM—although no longer the sponsor of the Delphi plans—
agreed to top up the benefits of certain union workers should the Delphi 
hourly plan be frozen or terminated, and maintained these top-up 
agreements at various points over the next decade. In addition, after 
Delphi filed for bankruptcy, GM agreed to take back all or part of Delphi’s 
hourly plan under certain conditions, and actually took back the pensions 
of nearly a fourth of Delphi hourly plan’s participants in 2008. PBGC 
officials noted they have not seen these types of agreements in any other 
plan terminations to date. Then, with GM’s own financial condition 
deteriorating, Treasury’s role as a shareholder led some to question the 
role Treasury might also be playing with respect to GM’s decisions 
regarding Delphi and its pension plans. As we have reported previously, 
Treasury’s multiple roles in situations involving the auto industry and 
workers’ pensions may create potential tensions and challenges. On 
behalf of the U.S. taxpayer, Treasury has an interest in safeguarding 
taxpayer investment, while also—through the Secretary of the Treasury’s 
role on PBGC’s board—protecting the financial viability of workers’ 
pension plans. Although Treasury has established policies to separate 
these interests, and various parties told us that Treasury did not play an 
active role in decisions regarding Delphi’s plans, potential tensions due to 
these multiple roles remain. In our prior work on the automakers’ pension 
plans, we concluded that the best way for Treasury to mitigate these 
tensions is through more open reporting to Congress and the public on its 
activities. In response to a previous recommendation, Treasury 
implemented a revised reporting policy, attempting to balance concerns 
about publicly disclosing proprietary information in a competitive market 
with the need for greater transparency. We believe that the most effective 
means of addressing concerns about Treasury’s different roles is for 
Treasury to continue to be as transparent as possible about its activities. 
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We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the 
Department of the Treasury (see appendix IV). Treasury’s comments 
generally agree with the findings and concluding observations in our report, 
emphasizing that Treasury did not authorize, approve, or consent to the 
termination of the Delphi salaried plan, and that PBGC independently 
decided - not the PBGC board or Treasury - to terminate the Delphi 
pensions. We continue to believe that Treasury’s multiple roles in situations 
involving the auto industry and workers’ pensions may create the 
appearance of potential tensions and challenges, and that the most 
effective means of addressing these concerns is for Treasury to continue to 
be as transparent as possible about its activities. 
In addition, Treasury, PBGC, and the Department of Labor, all provided 
technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. We also 
provided certain segments of the draft to Delphi, GM, DSRA, UAW, IUE, 
and USWA. We received technical comments on these segments from 
GM and USWA, and have incorporated these where appropriate, as well. 
 
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Director of PBGC, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary 
of Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and other interested parties. 
The report also is available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 
http://www.gao.gov. 
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 
Barbara Bovbjerg at (202) 512-7215 or bovbjergb@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 
be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix V. 
Barbara D. Bovbjerg 
Managing Director 
Education, Workforce, 
   and Income Security Issues 
Agency Comments 
and Our Evaluation 
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Top-10 firms 
Number of 
plans 
Fiscal year(s)  
of plan 
termination(s) Claims (by firm) 
Vested 
participants 
Average 
claim per 
vested 
participant 
Percent of 
total 
claims 
1. United Airlines  4 2005 $7,441,450,992  123,957 $60,033  16.3 
2. Delphi 6 2009 6,108,491,551 69,042 88,475 13.4   
3. Bethlehem Steel  1 2003 3,654,380,116 91,312 40,021 8.0 
4. US Airways  4 2003, 2005  2,751,534,173 55,770 49,337 6.0 
5. LTV Steela  6 2002, 2003, 2004  2,134,985,884 83,094 25,694 4.7 
6. Delta Air Lines  1 2006 1,641,083,525 13,291 123,473 3.6 
7. National Steel  7 2003 1,275,628,286 33,737 37,811 2.8 
8. Pan American Air  3 1991, 1992  841,082,434 31,999 26,285 1.8 
9. Trans World Airlines 2 2001 668,377,106 32,263 20,717 1.5 
10. Weirton Steel  1 2004 640,480,970 9,410 68,064 1.4 
Top-10 total  35  $27,157,495,038 543,875 $49,933 59.6 
All other total  4,257  $18,390,580,981 935,125 $19,666 40.4 
Total 4,292  $45,548,076,019 1,479,000 $30,797 100.0 
Source: PBGC, Pension Insurance Data Book 2009 and 2011 PBGC Annual Report.    
Note: Cumulative plans include 10 multiemployer plans trusteed by PBGC before 1980. PBGC has 
not trusteed any multiemployer plans since 1980. The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act 
of 1980 changed PBGC’s responsibility from trusteeship of troubled multiemployer plans to providing 
financial assistance (loans) to insolvent plans. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208. 
aDoes not include 1986 termination of a Republic Steel plan sponsored by LTV. 
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     Accrued-at-normal limitc 
 Maximum limitd   Phase-in limite 
Number 
Percentage 
reduced  Number 
Percentage 
reduced Plan 
Total number of 
participants (as 
of termination) 
Number of 
participants reviewed 
by PBGC as of  
June 2011 
Number with 
reduction(s) in 
PBGC estimated 
benefita 
Percentage 
reviewed with 
reductionb Number 
 
Percentage 
reduced 
Delphi Hourly Planf     11,619  41.42  472 1.68  352 1.25 
Delphi Salaried Plan 20,203 8,273 3,714 45 2,323  28.08  2,174 26.28  0 0 
Packard-Hughes Interconnect 
Non-Bargaining Retirement 
Plan (PHI_NBU) 
1,383 240 30 13 3  10.00  1 3.33  26 86.67 
Packard-Hughes Interconnect 
Bargaining Retirement Plan 
(PHI_BU) 
165 80 62 78 0  0  1 1.61  61 98.39 
ASEC Manufacturing 
Retirement Program (ASEC) 
533 126 6 5 0  0  4 66.67  0 0 
Delphi Mechatronic Systems 
Retirement Program (DMS) 
148 12 3 25 3  100.00  1 33.33  0 0 
Source: GAO analysis of PBGC data. 
aRetirees may have more than one type of reduction; therefore, the number of retirees with reductions and the number of reductions may not be the same for each plan. 
bThese rates are subject to change as more workers retire and receive early estimated reductions and final benefit determination letters from PBGC over the next year or more. 
cAccrued-at-normal limit: The monthly guaranteed benefit cannot be greater than the monthly benefit provided as a straight-life annuity (that is, a periodic payment for the life of the retiree, with no 
additional payments to survivors) available at the plan’s normal retirement age. The portion of any combined early retirement benefit and supplemental benefit that exceeds the normal retirement 
age straight life annuity is not guaranteed under this provision. 29 C.F.R. § 4022.21 (2011). 
dMaximum limit: The guaranteed benefit cannot exceed the statutory maximum, adjusted annually, at the time the plan terminates. In 2009, the maximum was $54,000 per year for a person who 
begins to receive benefits from PBGC at age 65 and with no survivor benefit (that is, a single-life annuity). The maximum is lower for those retiring under age 65 or with a survivor benefit. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1322(b)(3); 29 C.F.R. § 4022.23 (2011). 
ePhase-in limit: The guaranteed benefit cannot include any benefit increase that was made within 1 year of the date of the plan termination. For benefit improvements that became effective more 
than 1 year but less than 5 years prior to the plan’s termination, the guaranteed amount is the larger of 20 percent of the benefit increase or $20 per month of the increase for each full year the 
increase was in effect. 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) and (7); 29 C.F.R. § 4022.25 (2011). 
fPBGC also found that 1,567 hourly retirees should have their benefits reduced because it determined that they were not eligible for the “mutually satisfactory retirement,” which is a type of early 
retirement under the Hourly Plan. 
gAs of June 2011, PBGC still had about 2,000 of the 30,000 Hourly Plan retirees awaiting review.
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Upon the termination of a single-employer plan, plan assets are identified, 
valued, and then allocated to participant benefits, in accordance with the 
requirement of section 4044 of ERISA. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1344. In 
addition to plan assets, a portion of monies from company assets that 
PBGC recovers for unfunded benefit liabilities are allocated to participant 
benefits, in accordance with section 4022(c) of ERISA.29 U.S.C.  
§ 1322(c). 
Plan assets available to pay for benefits under the plan are allocated to 
participant benefits according to six priority categories, as described in 
table 4. Assets are allocated to each priority category in succession, 
beginning with priority category 1. If the plan has sufficient assets to pay 
for all benefits in a priority category, the remaining assets are allocated to 
the next lower priority category. This process is repeated until all benefits 
in priority categories 1 through 6 have been provided or until all available 
plan assets have been allocated. Most private sector defined benefit 
plans do not require or allow participant contributions, so there are rarely 
any benefits in priority categories 1 and 2. Thus, in most trusteed plans, 
asset allocation begins with the benefits in priority category 3, that is, the 
benefits of those retired or eligible to retire 3 years before the plan 
terminated. However, it should be noted that assets are allocated based 
on retirement eligibility, not retirement status, and that many participants 
have benefits in more than one category. Table 5 provides the allocation 
of plan assets and recoveries to priority categories among plans that had 
5,000 or more participants for the 10 firms with the largest claims. 
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Table 4: Allocation Priority Categories (PC) 
Priority 
Category Definition 
PC-1 Accrued benefits derived from voluntary employee contributions. 
(According to PBGC, such benefits are “extremely rare” among private 
sector defined benefit plans.) 
PC-2 Accrued benefits derived from mandatory employee contributions. 
(According to PBGC, such benefits are “quite uncommon” among private 
sector defined benefit plans.) 
PC-3 Annuity benefits that have been in pay status for at least 3 years before 
the plan’s termination date, or could have been in pay status for at least 3 
years before the plan’s termination date had the participant chosen to 
retire at his or her earliest possible retirement date; however, benefits 
subject to the phase-in limitation (that is, benefit increases made within the 
last 5 years) are excluded. These benefits can be either guaranteed or 
nonguaranteed. 
PC-4 Other guaranteed benefits and certain nonguaranteed benefits. The 
nonguaranteed benefits are those that are subject to the aggregate 
benefits limitation for participants in more than one plan that has been 
terminated with insufficient funds or are subject to special provisions 
applicable to substantial owners (that is, those owning more than 10 
percent of the company). 
PC-5 Other vested nonguaranteed benefits that a participant is entitled to under 
the plan; however, benefits that result solely due to the termination of the 
plan—which are deemed “forfeitable”—are excluded. 
PC-6 All other benefits under the plan. This category includes nonvested 
benefits and “grow-in” benefits, which are benefits that are provided in 
some situations where the company continues to operate after the plan is 
terminated. 
Source: PBGC. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Allocation of Plan Assets and Recoveries among Plans of Firms with 10 Largest Claims 
 
Firm/         
plansa 
Present valueb (millions of dollars) 
Recovery 
ratio 
(percent)e 
Allocations, by priority categoryf 
Plan 
assets 
Unfunded benefit liabilities Percent of liabilities funded by assets 
Percent of unfunded nonguaranteed benefits  
funded by recoveries 
Unfunded 
guaranteed 
benefitsc 
Unfunded 
non-
guaranteed 
benefits Totald PC3 PC4g PC5 PC6 PC3 PC4g PC5 PC6 
United Airlines                        
Ground 
Employees plan 
1,309  1,978  796 2,774 12.88 97 0 0 0 100 Not 
calculated 
13 0 
Management, 
administrative 
and public 
contact plan 
1,651  1,644  670 2,313 12.75 100 1 0 0 Not 
applicableh 
100 37 0 
Flight attendant 
plan 
1,427  1,644  256 1,901 13.23 69 0 0 0 100 Not 
calculated 
100 9 
Pilots plan 2,846  1,376  1,381 2,757 12.98 81 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 
Delphi (based on early  estimates, calculations not yet finalized)    
Hourly plan 3,700   4,000  400 4,400 6.3 (allocations not yet determined) (allocations not yet determined) 
Salaried plan 2,400  2,200 400 2,600 6.3 (allocations not yet determined) (allocations not yet determined) 
Bethlehem Steel                          
Bethlehem 
Steel plan 
3,533  3,693  835 4,529 1.11 60 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
US Airways                           
Plan for pilots 1,193 552 1,692 2,244 0.00 100 Not 
calculated 
0 0 Not 
applicableh 
Not 
calculated 
0 0 
Employees of 
IAM & AWi 
560  749  24 774 8.27 77 0 0 0 93 Not 
calculated 
0 0 
Flight 
attendants plan 
420 647 36 683 0.00 100 Not 
calculated 
0 0 Not 
applicableh 
Not 
calculated 
0 0 
Certain 
employees plan 
895 685 16 701 4.39 100 7 0 0 Not 
applicableh 
Not 
calculated 
6 0 
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Firm/         
plansa 
Present valueb (millions of dollars) 
Recovery 
ratio 
(percent)e 
Allocations, by priority categoryf 
Plan 
assets 
Unfunded benefit liabilities Percent of liabilities funded by assets 
Percent of unfunded nonguaranteed benefits  
funded by recoveries 
Unfunded 
guaranteed 
benefitsc 
Unfunded 
non-
guaranteed 
benefits Totald PC3 PC4g PC5 PC6 PC3 PC4g PC5 PC6 
LTV Steel                           
Hourly plan 1,697  1,681  672 2,353 1.97 66 0 0 0 100 Not 
calculated 
1 0 
Salary plan 384  302  66 367 2.12 65 0 0 0 100 Not 
calculated 
0 NA 
Delta Air Lines                          
Pilots plan 1,985  799  1,769 2,568 38.51 93 0 0 0 100 Not 
calculated 
34 0 
National Steel   
Hourly plan  482  471  149 620 0 77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weirton 
retirement 
program 
313  190  1 192 7.86 73 0 0 0 0 Not 
calculated 
8 0 
Corporation 
retirement 
program 
303  291  73 364 0. 69 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pan American World Airways 
Cooperative 
retirement 
income plan 
301  703  13 715 12.01 52 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 
Trans World 
Airlines 
                         
Plan for 
employees 
736  460  4 464 4.94 100 Not 
calculated 
0 0 Not 
applicableh 
Not 
calculated 
25 0 
Weirton Steel    
Retirement plan 540  637  205 842 0 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: GAO analysis of PBGC data 
aOf the 35 plans associated with the 10 largest claims, this table includes the 20 plans with 5,000 or more participants. Of the 15 remaining plans (including the 4 smaller Delphi plans): (1) 5 plans 
had unfunded nonguaranteed benefits that exceeded $20 million and the participants' portion of recoveries should be allocated using each plan's actual recovery ratio, (2) 9 plans had unfunded 
nonguaranteed benefits of less than $20 million and the participants' portion of recoveries should be allocated using the Small Plan Average Recovery Ratio (SPARR), and (3) 1plan did not have 
information on allocation of recoveries. 
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bThe present value is the actuarial value of benefits calculated as of the date of plan termination. 
cThe ERISA guaranteed benefits are equal to the plan assets and the unfunded guaranteed benefits. 
dThe total unfunded benefit liabilities are equal to the unfunded guaranteed benefits and the unfunded nonguaranteed benefits.  This total may be slightly higher or lower than the sum of these 
preceding columns due to rounding. 
eFor plans with unfunded nonguaranteed benefits exceeding $20 million, the recovery ratio is the actual recovered amount (under section 4022(c) of ERISA) divided by the unfunded 
nonguaranteed benefits.  In other cases, the ratio is an average of PBGC's recoveries over a 5-year period. 
fIn most cases, plans had no participants in either the PC1 or PC2 categories, therefore, we did not include these categories in the table. However, four of our plans did have participants in these 
categories: the US Airways Flight attendants plan, the Weirton retirement program plan, the Trans World Airlines plan for its employees, and the National Steel corporation retirement program. All 
these plans had sufficient plan assets to cover 100 percent of the unfunded PC2 benefits. 
gThe funded percentage was not calculated for the PC4 category in some plans. According to PBGC officials, this may have been because it was obvious that assets were insufficient so that 
calculating the funded status was unnecessary. 
hNot applicable because PC3 benefits were 100 percent funded by plan assets. 
iIAM & AW stands for the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.
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